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ii

REPLY TO DEFENDANT UTAH STATE BAR f S STATEMENT OF THE
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

Though other questions may be reached oy m i s court as
stated on Page 5 of the Brief of Appellant, the ultimate issue
now before this court is whether the complaint of
Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Ernest L. Bailey and Sharon S. Bailey
("Baileys") sets forth a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted.

The issue presented by the Defendant/Appellee Utah

State Bar ("State Bar") is but one issue that this court may or
may not decide to address.

If the Utah Supreme Court finds that

the Baileys' complaint does set forth a cause of action upon
which relief may be granted, it may not be necessary to decide
whether Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar provides complete immunity for the State Bar and its
employees.

SUMMARY OF REPLY

The State Bar can be sued for the tortious or wrongful acts
of its employees.

The State Bar is structured and established as

the administrative arm of the judicial branch of Utah's state
government.

There is no justification for the State Bar to be
1

treated any differently or possess any protection from private
law suits beyond that afforded any governmental agency.
The primary case relied upon by the State Bar, Holmstead v.
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972), is
distinguishable from the case at bar and its reasoning is
outdated and inapplicable to this matter.

The reasoning of the

majority opinion in Holmstead attempted to follow the common law
rule that when one tort-feasor is released all are released.
Since Holmstead, this rule has been abandoned by both the
legislature, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-42 (1953 as amended),
and by this Court in Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349 (1986).
In Utah, the release or exoneration of one tort-feasor does not
release any other tort-feasor.

Further, the claimed derivative

nature of an employer's liability based upon the acts of an
employee, is irrelevant to the imposition of liability upon that
employer.
The State Bar, by offering its services via Bar Counsel,
does accept the responsibility of an attorney-client relationship
with those individuals who seek the advise and assistance of Bar
Counsel because of Bar Counsel's unique expertise and knowledge
in the area of disciplinary proceedings.

By negotiating with Mr.

Calder on behalf of the Baileys, the State Bar and Bar Counsel
did accept the responsibility of an attorney-client relationship
2

and thus should not have suggested that the Bailey's should
return to Mr. Calder to have their legal work completed.

In the

least, Bar Counsel should have told the Bailey's to seek the
opinion of other lawyers in addition to that of Mr. Calder's.
Such a statement by Bar Counsel would not violate the prohibition
of disclosing disciplinary information regarding its members and
would have also provided the Bailey's with an opportunity to have
their legal rights and options evaluated by an impartial third
party.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE BAR CAN BE SUED FOR THE TORTIOUS OR WRONGFUL
ACTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar provides as follows:
Disciplinary personnel immune from Civil Suit. All members
of the Committee, Board, hearing committees, Bar Counsel,
disciplinary staff and other persons duly authorized to act
in disciplinary proceedings under these rules shall be
absolutely immune from civil suit or liability for any
conduct in the course of their official responsibilities.
The State Bar in their response brief makes the bald statement
that Rule XVI(a) provides a, "broad immunity" that would extend
beyond the individuals named in the Rule to the entire State Bar,
No support is provided for such an interpretation except that it

3

is claimed that the State Bar is similar to a corporation and
thus pursuant to Holmstead v. Abbot GM Diesel Inc., 493 P.2d 625
(Utah 1972), can only be liable as a master under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
In making these statements the State Bar ignores controlling
facts and law.

If the State Bar's speculation as to what, if

anything, was intended beyond the simple language of Rule XVI(a)
is correct, it would be in direct conflict with Rule (A)l of the
Rules of Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar.

Rule

(A)l is very clear in stating that, "The Utah State Bar may sue
and be s u e d , . . . "

There is absolutely no reason to believe that

Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline was intended to go
beyond its clear and simple language or that Rule XVI(a) was to
negate the straight forward statements of this Court when it
promulgated Rule (A)l of the Rules for Integration and Management
of the Utah State Bar.

POINT II
THE LAW RELIED UPON BY THE STATE BAR IS DISTINGUISHABLE AND
ITS REASONING IS OUTDATED AND INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE.
In its Response Brief, the State Bar relies primarily upon
Holmstead v. Abbot GM Diesel Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972).
Holmstead purports to stand for the proposition that if a
4

master's or employer's liability is based upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior and that employer's agent or employee is
exonerated from liability, the employer is similarly exonerated
from such liability.

Holmstead is distinguishable from the

instant case, the opinion has been criticized, its dissenting
opinion has been said to be better reasoned, and its holding has
been overruled or abandoned by both the legislature and this
Court.
In Holmstead, the plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against a
corporate defendant alleging that the defendant's employee
negligently caused plaintiff injuries and property loss as a
result of a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff and

agent/employee entered into a settlement and a covenant not to
sue.

The Plaintiff then attempted to bring an action for the

recovery of damages against the employer.

With Judges Ellett and

Tuckett dissenting, this Court ruled that under the doctrine of
respondeat superior a master's liability to a third person is
derivative and secondary and the exoneration of the servant
exonerates the master.
In the instant case, however, the Bailey's (the injured
third party) did not enter into any contract or agreement to
exonerate any parties from liability.

Rule XVI(a) of the

Procedures of Discipline do protect certain specified individuals
5

including Bar Counsel from civil suit or liability for any
conduct in the course of their official responsibilities.

Rule

XVI(a), howesver, should not be treated the same as an agreement
freely entered into by the parties.

In enacting Rule XVI(a), the

Supreme Court, did not intend to protect the entire State Bar
from any civil suit or liability.

By promulgating such a Rule

the Supreme Court merely decided to waive any rights the State
Bar might have otherwise had with respect to indemnity or
subrogation claims against its employees.
In 1986, this Court looked at a similar question to that
presented in Holmstead.

In Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349

(Utah 1986), this Court stated that Holmstead followed the common
law rule that release of one tort-feasor released all other tortfeasors.

This Court went on to state that:

The background of Section 78-27-42, enacted in 1973 as
part of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, Sections
78-27-39 to -43, indicated that it was designed to
reverse the common law rule. Krukiewicz, at 1351.
The derivative nature of the employer's liability is of
no concern to the victim, and he can compel either the
employer or the employee to compensate him for the
whole of his damages. Id.
Further, this Court found that the basis of liability among
joint tort-feasors is not relevant.

The point being, that both

the employer and the employee are at least, "severally liable for
the same injury to plaintiff."

Id.
6

Finally, the State Bar's liability is not based solely upon
the doctrine of respondeat superior as it was in Holmstead.
State Bar's liability is based upon numerous grounds.

The

First, the

State Bar may be held liable as an agency under the governmental
immunity statutes.

The State Bar's initial premise that it is

analogous to a corporation is erroneous.

The State Bar is the

administrative arm of the judicial branch of the Utah state
government.

There is no justification for this agency to be

treated any differently than the administrative arm of any other
branch of state government.

Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-30-10

(1953 as amended).
Second, this court has specifically stated at Rule (A)l of
the Rules of Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar
that the State Bar can be sued.

Third, the release of one joint

tort-feasor does not release any other tort-feasors.

Krukiewicz,

725 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-42
(1953 as amended).

Thus, the State Bar's reliance upon Holmstead

is misplaced and its arguments are inapplicable to the case at
bar.
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POINT III
THE STATE BAR AND ITS EMPLOYEES DO HAVE A DUTY TO ACT
RESPONSIBLY,
The State Bar attempts to argue that it could not have
protected the Baileys from Mr. Calder T s negligent actions and
that it had no duty to assist the Baileys in obtaining or at
least seeking out competent legal advice.

Rule VI(a) of the

Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar may provide that
certain disciplinary matters may not be disclosed to the public,
but the State Bar and Bar Counsel could have protected the
Baileys without disclosing any "confidential" information about
Mr. Calder.

The Bar and Bar Counsel could have fulfilled their

duty by merely suggesting that the Baileys seek the opinion of a
lawyer other than Mr. Calder to evaluate Mr. Calder f s conduct and
to determine the most appropriate actions to be taken in the
Bankruptcy Court.

Instead, after negotiating with Mr. Calder on

behalf of the Baileys, Bar Counsel merely told the Baileys to
return to Mr. Calder and he would continue representing them at a
discounted rate.
The State Bar now seeks to avoid any liability by claiming
that no attorney-client relationship existed between the State
Bar and the Baileys.

By negotiating with Mr. Calder on behalf of
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the Baileys, however, the Bar did accept the responsibility of an
attorney-client relationship.

CONCLUSION
The Baileys have been hurt by the conduct of the State Bar
and its Bar Counsel.

The State Bar is in a unique position of

responsibility in the community.
be taken lightly.

This responsibility should not

There is no justification for the State Bar or

its Counsel to practice law and provide legal advise and not be
held to at least the same standard of care as the rest of the
legal community which the State Bar is supposed to oversee.
For the reasons stated above, and for the sake of the
public's perception of the role of the Utah State Bar in being
the liaison between the community and the legal profession, the
Baileys respectfully request this Court to reverse the trial
court's decision to dismiss the Bailey's complaint, and grant the
Baileys an opportunity to have their day in court.

DATED this 5th day of September, 1990.

By:

- <_/_
STEVEN P. ROWE
'
Counsel for Plaintiffs/appellants
Ernest L. Bailey and
Sharon S. Bailey
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